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EXPANSION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT 

JURISDICTION AS A MEANS TO PROVIDE 

MORE ADEQUATE REMEDIES TO 

VICTIMS OF MASS TORTS 

CARL L. BUCKI· 
With each technological advance, humankind encounters new 
risks of injury and hann. Although the benefits of these advances may 
fully justify the risks, and may even create a higher overall level of 
safety, the world nonetheless faces specific dangers whose potential 
scope and severity are unparalleled. A single tortious act may cause 
death for thousands, as when lethal chemicals were released from a 
factory at Bhopal, India in December 1984. 1 Contaminants from nu­
clear and chemical sources may produce long-tenn environmental 
dangers whose impact is broad and severe, but unpredictable. Even 
such innocent conduct as the distribution of an FDA-approved drug 
may create a DES horror which continues to grow after 25 years.2 
For victims and tortfeasors alike, unique challenges arise from the 
sheer magnitude of damages that derive from mass torts. The purpose 
of this essay is to examine the remedies which should be available to 
these victims, and to suggest a solution to the inadequacies that are 
inherent in the current system of remedies. 
Mass torts impact not only upon tort victims and tortfeasors, but 
also upon society in general. From all three of these perspectives, cur­
rently available remedies are grossly inadequate. 
From the perspective of an injured party, legal remedies are ade­
quate only if they pennit both the procurement of a fair judgment and 
the collection of that judgment. After some mass torts, plaintiffs can 
easily identify the party who is proximately responsible for their inju­
ries. For example, when an airplane crashes, one can prepare a com­
plaint that adequately recites the cause of action against known 
defendants and discovery techniques will verify whether the list of de­
• Partner, Cohen Swados Wright Hanifin Bradford & Brett, Buffalo, New York. 
1. See Robert D. McFadden, Indian Disaster. Chronicle ofa Nightmare, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1984, at A-I. 
2. For a description of the problems associated with the drug DES, see Sindell v. 
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
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fendants is sufficiently comprehensive. However, in many circum­
stances, the only certainty is that the plaintiff has been injured. 
Although chemical or other contamination may pose identifiable 
health risks, it is far more difficult to prove that one's exposure is prox­
imately responsible for a particular health problem. Even if one can 
show proximate cause, he or she may be unable to identify the 
tortfeasor. For instance, in the case of DES, existing medical records 
may fail to disclose the manufacturer of the drug which was actually 
ingested.3 Moreover, when the injury is ultimately discovered, the 
statute of limitations may bar recovery. 
In· short, modem torts frequently entail problems in establishing 
certain traditional requirements for tort liability. Particularly burden­
some are proof of proximate cause and restrictions on the tolling of the 
statute of limitations. Although certain jurisdictions have found solu­
tions favorable to tort victims,4 any inconsistency of approach will 
promote forum shopping and the expensive litigation of conflict of law 
issues. 
However, the primary impediment to the realization of an ade­
quate remedy for mass torts is not the ability to obtain a judgment, but 
rather, the inability to satisfy that judgment. When a single defendant 
is responsible for thousands of severe injuries, a meaningful recovery 
may easily exceed the most generous insurance coverage, as well as 
any equity of a highly solvent tortfeasor. Moreover, many mass 
tortfeasors may have maintained minimal or no insurance coverage, or 
have minimal net worth, or may have even ceased doing business. As­
tute business people who can identify ventures that entail a high risk of 
mass injury, will either segregate those activities into poorly funded 
corporations, or abandon such activity to others who have minimal 
financial responsibility. Thus, inevitably, the perpetrators of mass 
torts will tend to be entities that lack the means to provide adequate 
recovery for claimants. 
The current tort system. is also inadequate from the perspective of 
defendants of mass claims. Generally, American courts have adopted 
3. See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925. The plaintiff in this case knew she had been 
injured as a result of DES ingested by her mother during her pregnancy, but did not know 
which of several manufacturers had caused her injury. 
4. For example, in Sindell, the California high court developed the theory of market· 
share allocation to compensate victims when the tortfeasor cannot be identified. Sindell, 
607 P.2d at 937-38. Another reform has been the advent of the "discovery rule" in profes­
sional malpractice cases, whereby the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff has 
discovered that he or she has been tortiously injured. See, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 166-67 (5th ed. 1984). 
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the view stated in 1681 by the English court in Lambert v. Bessey,S 
that "the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor, as the 
loss and damage of the· party suffering."6 Thus, the degree of moral 
culpability will not normally affect the defendant's financial exposure. 
Absent the imposition of punitive damages, defendants exhibiting a 
history of consistent recklessness will encounter liability only for the 
damages inflicted. These damages may be limited due either to sheer 
luck or to the timely intervention of policing agencies. By contrast, a 
responsible and conscientious entity may face damages having no rela­
tionship to the character of its conduct. Negligence of a subcontractor 
or parts supplier may be imputed to an otherwise innocent manufac­
turer or servicer.7 Even in this era of comparative liability, defendants 
generally remain jointly and severally liable for. all damages, and enjoy 
only a right of contribution from other tortfeasors.8 Accordingly, a 
tortfeasor who is only five percent responsible for an injury, must sat­
isfy the entire claim, including whatever portion may be attributable 
to insolvent co-defendants. 9 
Even if an entity is never named as a defendant in a mass tort 
claim, it will nonetheless encounter the burden of insurance premiums 
that are inflated by reason of such exposure. Admittedly, the risk of 
mass tort liability does not supply a complete explanation for the ex­
plosion in liability premiums. Also, from the victims' perspective, 
such insurance coverage may be inadequate. The potential for mass 
tort liability, however, does create a threshold risk with respect to the 
amount of coverage that does exist. Accordingly, that threshold risk 
must be accounted for in any calculation of appropriate premium 
levels. 
Responsible suppliers and manufacturers can potentially incur li­
abilities that bear no relationship either to any specific conduct or to 
their general level of compliance with standards of safety. The pros­
pect of mass tort liability, therefore, creates a drain on business profits. 
Unfortunately for victims, businesses frequently avoid this burden by 
5. 83 Eng. Rep. 220 (T. Raym. 1681). 
6. Id. at 221. 
7. See KEETON, supra note 4 § 71 at 570. 
8. See generally 74 AM. JUR. 20 Torts § 73 (1974). 
9. This result occurs due to the common-law principle of joint and several liability. 
Under this principle, a tort victim injured by more than one tortfeasor can recover all 
damages incurred from a single defendant, even if that tortfeasor is only minimally respon­
sible for the injury. See Note, Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A System­
atic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 628, 635 (1988). The trend in tort reform is to limit joint and several 
liability, especially in comparative negligence states. [d. at 636-37. 
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failing to maintain either insurance or an adequate level of 
capitalization. 
Finally, and most importantly, the current system of remedies for 
victims of mass torts is inadequate from the perspective of society at 
large. With few exceptions, mass torts arise from activities which are 
both beneficial to, and desired by society. Even when risks are avoida­
ble, society sometimes prefers not to incur the cost of eliminating that 
risk. For example, airplane disasters occur either because society pre­
fers air transportation over the elimination of unavoidable risks in fiy­
ing, or because society is unwilling to incur the cost of enforcing 
absolute compliance with safety standards. Consciously or not, soci­
ety has chosen to enjoy the benefits of products and services that are 
associated with significant risk, such as the products of hazardous 
wastes. Meanwhile, society assumes that a free market place will ulti­
mately satisfy market demand for products that entail risk from either 
their use or production. This assumption is not necessarily accurate, 
as the risk of tort liability may force a manufacturer to avoid produc­
tion of a dangerous product. When that production entails sophisti­
cated processes, the market place may be unable to offer alternative 
sources. From the perspective of society, therefore, the status quo 
may threaten the regular procurement of the benefits that society 
desires, while permitting a haphazard and undesirable distribution of 
the resulting burden. 
Ultimately, mass torts represent a burden that is imposed, in 
whole or in part, upon the tort victim, the tortfeasor, or society. To 
the extent that adequate tort compensation is either unavailable or not 
recoverable, individual victims will assume first hand the burden of 
those underlying risks which society has allowed. The imposition of 
tort liability merely shifts that burden from victim to tortfeasor. 
Whether or not liability can be imposed upon a tortfeasor, society 
usually assumes at least some portion of the tort burden. When con­
tamination was discovered in the Love Canal area of Niagara Falls, for 
example, the State of New York provided direct relief to the tort vic­
tims by agreeing to purchase the affected properties. \0 As prospective 
tortfeasors, drug companies obtained federal relief from potential lia­
bilities arising from the distribution of a swine fiu vaccine during the 
mid-1970s. 11 Such complete transfers of liability are unusual, however. 
More typical is a partial, de facto transfer of cost. Uncompensated 
tort victims will frequently tum to the state for medical and other 
10. 7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 516 (15th ed. 1989). 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k) (1988). 
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care. When indigency results, society will bear the cost of public 
assistance. Ultimately, tortfeasors will also recover from society at 
least part of any assumed liability. This assumption may be built di­
rectly into the cost of a tortfeasor's product, or more indirectly, into 
price adjustments that reflect higher premiums for liability insurance. 
Under the status quo, society does not follow any consistent or 
logical path in its assumption of some or all of the cost and burden of 
every mass tort. One might hope that in most cases, disaster compen­
sation would become a cost of doing business, one which is disbursed 
to society through liability insurance premiums that are ultimately re­
flected in prices for all goods and services. Unfortunately, this ideal is 
frequently not achieved. At times, government will directly assume 
financial responsibility on behalf of society. In many instances, how­
ever, such burdens are spread, helter skelter, to innocent victims and 
their families. Victims may be rendered insolvent, thereby forcing so­
ciety to assume the expense of assuring their minimal welfare. Cer­
tainly, society has not accepted any consistent approach that will 
guarantee a just distribution of the burdens created by mass torts. 
Such random inconsistency necessarily means that society fails to at­
tain the ideal result in all circumstances. 
The imposition of a burden is justified only by the attainment of 
some greater benefit. One may accept mass torts as an unfortunate 
product of technological advances. The status quo, however, fails to 
assure those benefits, and may even place them in jeopardy. The po­
tentialliability arising from a mass disaster may easily exceed the pol­
icy limits of any insurance coverage, and force an otherwise solvent 
tortfeasor into insolvency. For example, the fear of such a result 
caused a severe decline in the price of Union Carbide's stock immedi­
ately after the Bhopal chemical leak. 12 If society values a particular 
enterprise, it should not allow that enterprise to be destroyed by an 
unaffordable tort recovery. Of course, a disastrous incident may in 
itself reveal a previously unrecognized risk which society is not willing 
to accept knowingly. But if the risk was previously justifiable, it may 
continue to be justified even after a tragic incident. At present, a tort 
suit seeks to establish liability and damages, and does not purport to 
determine whether the benefit of that enterprise will justify its contin­
ued operation. It is illogical for a society to accept the risk of a partic­
ular enterprise, and thereafter, to allow the destruction of that 
12. See Vartanig G. Vartan, Market Place: Union Carbide and Insurance, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Dec. 12, 1984, at 10. 
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enterprise without perfonning a critical analysis of whether those risks 
warrant continued operation in light of desired benefits. 
In summary, the remedies available for mass torts are inadequate, 
not only from a victim's perspective, but also from that of the 
tortfeasor and society in general. To the extent that risks exist, society 
should choose either to eliminate those risks, or to assure fair compen­
sation to innocent victims. Although society should critically analyze 
its continued acceptance of all risks in the context of any new disas­
trous event, it is logically inconsistent to permit an enterprise to be 
destroyed in the event that an acceptable risk ultimately results in 
harm. 
One begins to develop a proposal for reform by identifying the 
principles and objectives of an ideal system of remedies. I suggest that 
any comprehensive reform should encompass the following 
considerations: 
1. Society should provide fair compensation to victims of mass 
torts. Since society benefits from the activities associated with disas­
ters, society should assure an appropriate assumption of any resulting 
burdens. Tort law is premised on the theory that victims are entitled 
to compensation for injuries received.13 If one accepts this premise, 
then it is contradictory for society to allow a theoretical basis for re­
covery without also providing access to resources sufficient to satisfy 
that right of recovery. Innocent victims should obtain a recovery that 
is based on the wrongfulness of the tortfeasor's conduct, rather than 
on the depth of that tortfeasor's pocketbook. Adequate compensation 
satisfies our concepts of justice and fair play, and is consistent with the 
objective of preventing indigency. 
An underlying principle of fair compensation should be to elimi­
nate artificial barriers that preclude recovery for reasons beyond the 
victim's control. For this reason, the statute of limitations should be 
tolled pending discovery of a wrongful injury. Some source of recov­
ery should be available even when one cannot locate a solvent defend­
ant, or when a victim is unable to isolate the responsible party from 
among a number of possible tortfeasors. 
2. Society should hold tortfeasors accountable for their conduct. 
By holding tortfeasors accountable for their reckless or negligent acts, 
one creates an incentive for achieving safety and for minimizing risks. 
The degree of accountability, however, must bear a reasonable rela­
tionship to the degree of culpability. Thus, it seems inappropriate to 
impose joint and several liability upon an entity that has only remote 
13. KEETON, supra note 4, § 4 at 20. 
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responsibility for the injury. Furthermore, although a statute of limi­
tations should not operate to the detriment of one suffering a still un­
discovered injury, society may still desire to give tortfeasors an 
opportunity to put their pasts behind them. This is particularly appro­
priate in the corporate context, where the current management may 
have no relationship to those in charge at the time of events that oc­
curred far beyond the normal statute of limitations, absent tolling. 
3. The imposition of damages should not be allowed to destroy 
those enterprises which entail risks that society needs or desires to as­
sume. For a particular defendant, large judgments in excess of insur­
ance coverage may result in liquidation. Meanwhile, the potential for 
such liability will force other reputable businessmen to abandon cer­
tain endeavors. When risky endeavors are desirable, society should 
structure remedies that recognize and accommodate a need for the 
continued performance of the task at hand. 
4. To maximize benefits available to victims of mass torts, an 
ideal system should minimize transactional costs. In tort litigation, a 
substantial portion of any recovery is usually consumed by insurance 
overhead, attorneys' fees and other expenses associated with proving 
liability and damages. Such expenses may well be justified by the risk 
of litigation and by requirements for proof of a unique cause of action. 
But with certain mass torts, liability may not be at issue. In fact, the 
principle of collateral estoppel can operate to extend a finding of liabil­
ity to factually similar cases. 14 In such instances, circumstances may 
warrant steps to reduce transactional costs that would otherwise be 
incurred. 
5. Any program must prioritize the application of limited re­
sources. Amidst budgetary pressures at all levels of government, it is 
certainly unrealistic to propose any comprehensive governmental 
guarantee of indemnification. Nor should we resort to a pro-rata dis­
tribution among all creditors. Rather, I submit that society has suffi­
cient ability to set priorities. For example, society may appropriately 
adopt a scheme that reimburses medical expenses and the cost to re­
pair property damage; that sets a schedule for reimbursement of per­
sonal injury claims; and that prioritizes those scheduled amounts over 
14. See Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. 
REV. 63 (1988). Professor Ratliff explains the effect of collateral estoppel in tort cases in 
this way: "If a plaintiff establishes in Case 1 that the roll bar on a four-wheel drive Blaster 
is defective, subsequent plaintiffs who were not parties to Case 1 can hold Blaster Company 
to that finding." Id. at 65. Professor Rattliff goes on to discuss the limitations of collateral 
estoppel in reducing tort litigation, since, although the defendant is bound by a finding of 
liability, the plaintiff has a due process right to try the issue. Id. 
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claims for pain and suffering. The wrongful death claims of certain 
dependents may be accorded priority over all other claims. 
Any proposal for mass tort remedies must withstand critical anal­
ysis from the perspectives of effectiveness and workability. First, to be 
effective, a proposal must foster assumed goals and principles, such as 
the five identified above. As with any set of competing objectives, 
some trade-offs are inevitable. When one accords more value to the 
survival of beneficial enterprises, he or she inevitably diminishes the 
extent to which that enterprise is held accountable for its culpable 
conduct. 
Second, the proposal must be workable, and to be workable it 
must be affordable. To achieve a workable program, it may be neces­
sary to compromise the perfect attainment of certain desired objec­
tives. Let us assume that the government cannot afford to guarantee 
all compensation normally awarded to tort victims. Proposals for the 
payment of compensation must not impose excessive burdens upon 
either governmental budgets or upon the contributors to any special 
public fund. At least initially, fiscal considerations will probably re­
quire that any proposal limit its focus only to remedies for mass torts. 
Scholars and commentators have offered many proposals for re­
form of the tort system. IS Most of these proposals are steeped in con­
troversy, in that they contemplate a change either in the linkage 
between fault and recovery, or in the traditional methods for establish­
ing liability. Pending resolution of these philosophical issues, many 
tort victims can look only to potentially insolvent or underinsured 
tortfeasors for recovery. Meanwhile, for manufacturers, suppliers, 
and other potential tortfeasors, an inadvertent or unavoidable event 
leading to mass injury may create liability so far in excess of resources 
that the inevitable result is either liquidation or a petition for relief 
under the Bankruptcy Code. 16 
At the present time, bankruptcy provides not only less than com­
plete remedies for tort victims, but also generally inadequate relief for 
tortfeasors. For victims, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession 
can only distribute those assets of the estate that are available after 
administrative expenses are deducted. Although the automatic stay 
15. See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson and Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort 
Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 1481 (1992); W. John Thomas, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis':· A 
Critical Examination of a Public Debate, 65 TEMP. L. Q. 459 (1992); Symposium, The 
Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 701 (1992); Henry J. Reske, Study: 
Quayle Was Right . .. And Wrong, 6 W. Va. Law. 11 (1992). 
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). 
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provided by the Bankruptcy Code l7 will halt the havoc of a race to the 
courthouse by multiple plaintiffs, it is unlikely to enhance their collec­
tive recovery. Typically, the liquidation of assets in chapter 7 bank­
ruptcy18 nets significantly less than the value of those assets to a going 
concern. Similarly, a chapter 11 proceeding19 mandates only that tort 
victims receive a distribution at least as great as they would have re­
ceived under chapter 7.20 
For the business debtor, present bankruptcy alternatives are also 
inadequate. Tortfeasors must choose either to liquidate under chapter 
7, or to reorganize under chapter 11. Chapter 7 liquidation will gener­
ally result in cessation of business activity, and will result in the forfei­
ture of all business assets to the trustee for liquidation for the benefit of 
creditors.21 As presently structured, chapter 11 imposes undesirable 
burdens upon business operations, and offers only limited long-tenn 
relief against tort claims. 
The filing of a chapter 11 petition will immediately restrain the 
collection and use of cash collateral, which is defined to include cash, 
deposits, accounts and receivables, in which a secured creditor may 
have an interest.22 A chapter 11 debtor generally may not sell real 
estate, borrow money, or perfonn any activity outside the ordinary 
course of its business, without permission of the bankruptcy court, and 
then only after notice is given to some or all of the creditors.23 Man­
agement may receive only a reasonable level of compensation, usually 
as approved by court order.24 The debtor must file monthly financial 
reports, which become public records and which are subject to scru­
tiny from the office of the United States Trustee and from creditors.2s 
Furthennore, the debtor's officers must submit to periodic examina­
tion from any party in interest.26 To assist with their review of the 
debtor's operations, creditors may fonn committees,27 which may in 
tum petition the court for appointment of counsel.28 Counsel for a 
creditor's committee are entitled to compensation from the debtor's 
17. 11 u.s.c. § 362 (1988). 
18. Id. §§ 701-66. 
19. Id. §§ 1101-74. 
20. Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
21. Id. § 704. 
22. Id. § 363. 
23. Id. §§ 363-64. 
24. Id. § 330. 
25. Id. §§ 704(8), 1106(a)(I); FED. R. BANK P. 2015. 
26. 11 u.s.c. § 341 (1988); FED. R. BANK P. 2004. 
27. 11 u.s.c. § 1102 (1988). 
28. Id. § 1103. 
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estate.29 Thus, the debtor must not only account to creditors for its 
actions, but must also pay for the privilege of being scrutinized. 
In a proper case, chapter 11 is an effective tool to restructure a 
business having financial problems. The benefits of chapter II, how­
ever, also entail burdens, such as those outlined above. For a business 
that would be in a sound financial condition but for the prospect of 
mass tort liability, these burdens will represent a very bitter pill. 
Although chapter 11 contains counterbalancing benefits, these advan­
tages are not particularly useful with respect to tort liabilities. In a 
typical case, bankruptcy will stay most outstanding litigation, so that 
disputed matters might be subject to resolution in the context of bank­
ruptcyadministration. However, the judicial code specifies that bank­
ruptcy court jurisdiction excludes personal injury tort and wrongful 
death claims, and that such matters must be tried in district court. 30 
Thus, chapter 11 will not preclude the cost and expense of tort 
litigation. 
In my view, a solution to inadequate mass tort remedies can be 
found in an expanded application of bankruptcy jurisdiction. The pur­
pose of this essay is not to describe all elements of such a program, but 
rather, to provide a broad outline of those reforms which a viable pro­
gram must ultimately incorporate. Specifically, I would recommend 
legislation that adopts the following principles: 
1. A new bankruptcy chapter should be created for debtors hav­
ing potential mass tort liability. A petition under this chapter would 
be filed either voluntarily by the tortfeasor, or involuntarily by tort 
victims having claims sufficient in dollar amount and quantity. 
2. A filing under this new bankruptcy chapter would impose no 
restraints on the normal business operation of the tortfeasor. Unless 
the case were converted to another bankruptcy chapter, the bank­
ruptcy court would lack authority to appoint either a trustee or a cred­
itor's committee. The debtor would not be subject to restrictions 
applicable under other chapters with respect to the use of cash collat­
eral, the enforcement of executory contracts, the lease or sale of prop­
erty, or any other regular activity that would be permissible but for the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition. Activities outside the ordinary course 
of business, such as a disposition of assets without consideration, 
would be prohibited, however, pending confirmation of a reorganiza­
tion plan. 
3. The bankruptcy court would receive sole jurisdiction to de­
29. Id. § 330. 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1988). 
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termine tort liabilities. Thus, an automatic stay would apply with re­
spect to tort litigation in any other forum. The legislation might also 
limit various defenses, such as, for example, through a broader provi­ " 
sion for tolling statutes of limitations. In exchange for the protection 
of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor would accept a determination of 
liability in some expedited fashion, perhaps in a way similar to proce­
dures now employed to resolve workers' compensation claims. 
4. The proposal would require that specific assets of the 
tortfeasor be dedicated to a fund created for the satisfaction of tort 
liabilities. At a minimum, this fund would include: the proceeds of 
any liability insurance, a sum that fairly represents the legal expenses 
which the insurance carrier would have otherwise incurred, all net 
profits that are received during a pre-determined statutory period, and 
possibly a portion of the debtor's net assets. Reasonable limits on the 
total contribution could be calculated as a multiple or fraction of the 
total net equity of the business. The contributions also would not ex­
ceed those damages for which the debtor is fairly responsible. Thus, 
legislation might limit a business' contribution to that payment which 
would have been due if the business had been able to obtain contribu­
tion from all joint tortfeasors, or if the tolling of the statute of limita­
tions had been limited to some more reasonable period of time. 
5. Tort claims would be satisfied from the special fund, in ac­
cord only with statutory priorities for payment. Although entitled to 
a priority, legal expenses would be paid only upon approval by the 
court, or pursuant to reasonable schedules. 
6. The court would retain equitable powers to fashion an appro­
priate plan for the collection of assets and a distribution of proceeds. 
If one expects adverse medical consequences to appear over many 
years, for example, the court could fashion a long term arrangement 
for payment of a percentage of future profits into the tort fund. Simi­
larly, disbursements might be made in anticipation of future payments 
into the account. 
7. The various priorities would be divided into first and second 
tiers. Those funds that exist in the bankrupt's special tort account 
would satisfy as many priorities as possible. In the event that such 
funds were inadequate, the first tier claimants would also have re­
course to a national mass tort claim account. Funding for such an 
account would necessarily. derive either from a tax on business enter­
prises, or from general revenues. The cut-off between the first and 
second tier would depend upon the level of funding that is adopted. If 
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the legislature were to allow only for limited funding, then the first tier 
of claimants would unfortunately include only a few areas of liability. 
The above proposal would fulfill all of the goals set forth earlier in 
this Article. First, the structure has the capacity to assure fair com­
pensation to victims of mass torts. The degree of fairness, however, is 
a judgment that will depend upon placement of the division between 
first and second tier priorities. In all events, the proposal is fair in that 
it assumes a rational distribution of limited assets in accord with pri­
orities that are theoretically consistent with concepts of need. 
Second, tortfeasors are obligated to pay into a fund on account of 
their own conduct. A formula for payment can be set to provide con­
tributions which over time will accumulate to the liquidated value of 
the business at the time of bankruptcy. 
Third, payment of damages will not result in destruction of the 
business enterprise. Indeed, the business operations should continue 
in virtually the same fashion as if a tortious incident had not occurred. 
Holders of an equity interest in the business may forfeit profits, but 
from the perspective of society, the benefits of continued business ac­
tivity will survive. From the business' perspective, payment will be 
limited to a sum which fairly reflects that business' degree of 
culpability. 
Fourth, the proposal will minimize transactional costs. From the 
outset, it will reduce expenses paid for defending massive claims, pos­
sibly spread throughout a number of jurisdictions. The proposal con­
templates accelerated methods for determining liability, thereby 
reducing the cost of proving a victim's claim. Moreover, for all trans­
actional expenses, court review should reduce the potential for pay­
ments in excess of actual costs. Finally, my proposal would explicitly 
prioritize the application of limited resources for the satisfaction of 
preferred claims. 
Mass torts present unique problems that society is likely to en­
counter with ever growing frequency. The potential magnitude of in­
juries will surely test the adequacy of any sources of tort 
compensation. It is imperative, therefore, that society adopt a plan 
that intelligently marshals available assets for the benefit both of tort 
victims and of society itself. In my judgment, such a plan can effect a 
maximum recovery to the most deserving plaintiffs while still promot­
ing the survival of affected business enterprises. In contrast, the status 
quo invites victims to pursue remedies without regard to any overall 
scheme, and at great transactional cost. Although society may be able 
to afford that approach with respect to claims of limited nature, it is 
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unacceptable when there are perils that are certain to leave many un­
satisfied claims. I propose that society reorganize culpable enterprises 
for the benefit of both society and the innocent parties who stand to 
absorb the losses under the current system. 
